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I. SALES TAX
A. REPORTED CASESTHE reported cases covered multiple topics but also reflect the fol-
lowing common themes: the importance of focusing precisely on
the applicable statutory language, the difficulty of articulating the
standards for exemptions in complex fact patterns (such as certain
software sales for resale), and the appropriate level of deference ac-
corded to the comptroller's interpretations. The court cases below reflect
a mix of taxpayer and comptroller victories in decisions that show how
the courts interpret not only the facts before them but also these repeat-
ing issues.
In 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Combs, the taxpayer sought a refund of sales tax
"assessed on 7-Eleven's purchase of financial software for its retail
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stores."' The case focuses on an issue that the comptroller and taxpayers
have been debating for some time-the circumstances in which a trans-
feror of services, software, or both is entitled to a resale exemption for
software with respect to which the transferor retains some rights or bene-
fits.2 In 1993, 7-Eleven purchased a software license from Canmax Retail
Systems, Inc., for custom computer software to be installed on computers
in 7-Eleven's company stores and its franchise stores, both in and outside
of Texas. 3 The Austin Court of Appeals agreed with 7-Eleven that some
of its purchases of software qualified for the sale-for-resale exemption
and that software was held in tax-free inventory until shipped out of
state.4 A main point of discussion was whether the software could qualify
for the sale-for-resale exemption as the transfer of tangible personal
property integral to the performance of a taxable service (data process-
ing) by 7-Eleven.5 The court of appeals concluded that 7-Eleven did in-
deed perform taxable data processing services for its franchisees, 6 and
even though 7-Eleven benefited from the software, "[s]o long as the pur-
chaser's intent in acquiring the property was to transfer it as an integral
part of a taxable service, the elements of the section 151.006(3) definition
would appear to be satisfied."7 The court of appeals thus disagreed with
the comptroller's theory that 7-Eleven's benefitting from the software
1. No. 03-08-00212-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 7067; at *46 (Tex. App.-Austin Aug.
31, 2009, pet. withdrawn). Shortly before the article went to print, the Austin Court of
Appeals issued a substituted opinion based on its concern that the evidence did not show
whether the software involved a single license or multiple licenses that should be allocated
among multiple software users. See 7-Eleven v. Combs, No. 03-08-00212-CV, 2010 Tex.
App. LEXIS 3001 (Tex. App.-Austin Apr. 22, 2010, no pet. h.). The State argued in its
motion for rehearing that the comptroller has a "longstanding and consistent policy" of
treating the purchase of a single license for a computer program as a single piece of tangi-
ble personal property in order to argue that the software development charges were "a
single charge for a single license in the form of Golden Masters, not a price per copy." Id.
at *58. The case was remanded for further evidentiary determinations. The remand is
noteworthy not only for the substantive issue involved, but also because the court of ap-
peals allowed the State to raise this new argument on appeal despite the fact that, in the
dissent's words, "the State was conspicuously silent regarding this 'longstanding and consis-
tent policy' until the eleventh hour of this litigation." Id.
2. Id. at *46. This suit pertained only to licenses related to store software, and a
separate suit was filed regarding host software. Id. at 21.
3. Id. at *2. The court of appeals disagreed with 7-Eleven that it could prove as a
matter of law that the store software was not used in Texas merely because it was eventu-
ally installed in out-of-state company stores. Id. at *44. Therefore, the court of appeals
determined that the record did not conclusively prove either use or absence of use in Texas
with respect to software delivered out of state. Id. at *45. However, the court of appeals
agreed that 7-Eleven's software purchases qualified for the sale-for-resale exemption even
when some portion of the software would ultimately be used by 7-Eleven rather than be
resold. Id. at *37.
4. Id. The court determined that items removed from the tax free inventory were
subject to sales tax rather than use tax, but it appropriately concluded that the definition of
"use" is material to determining whether the items are used in Texas and therefore subject
to tax. Id. at *41-42.
5. See id. at *16-27.
6. Id. at *19.
7. Id. at *23. The court of appeals disagreed with the trial court's view that the stat-
ute contains a requirement that the recipient of the service be the "sole" benefiting party.
Id.
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somehow negated the sale-for-resale exemption.8
In determining whether the software was integral to the performance
of data-processing services, the court of appeals focused on whether the
"service could be completed but for the tangible personal property," in
this case, the software. 9 The court of appeals held that "the store
software was essential to the performance of data-processing services that
were performed by 7-Eleven, [and] it is not relevant under the statute
that the store software may have been put to other uses as well."'o
The court of appeals also discussed the "essence-of-the-transaction
test," developed to address sales that include both taxable and nontax-
able elements, in response to the comptroller's argument that 7-Eleven
had not purchased the software for resale but rather to automate 7-
Eleven's operations and to protect its franchise fee." The court of ap-
peals observed that the essence-of-the-transaction test has been used to
determine whether a bundled sale of taxable and nontaxable items is en-
tirely taxable or entirely nontaxable or whether the sale can be unbun-
dled and treated as two separate transactions (one taxable and one not),
but that there was no authority to apply the test in this situation in order
to negate 7-Eleven's resale exemption. 12
The court of appeals also correctly confirmed that the sale-for-resale
exemption does not require that the reseller actually collect tax on the
service, only that the service be a "taxable service." 13 Thus, if the tangi-
ble personal property (e.g., software) is integral to the performance of a
taxable service (e.g., data processing), it should be irrelevant whether the
data processing is actually taxed in the particular transaction in ques-
tion.14 The court of appeals therefore reversed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment for the State and held that 7-Eleven was entitled to a
sales tax refund for the purchase of Canmax store software for resale and
delivery to its franchise stores.15
Combs v. Health Care Services Corp., a district court case consolidated
with a Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas sales tax refund case, also
addressed the sale-for-resale exemption.16 Health Care Services Corpo-
ration (HCSC) asserted that it provided health care management services
to the federal government for resale. Specifically, HCSC claimed that:
(1) certain purchases of tangible personal property were made for resale
to the federal government in connection with health care management
services HCSC provided to the government and (2) services consumed by
8. Id. at *20.
9. Id. at *26.
10. Id.
11. Id. at *28.
12. Id. at *30-32, *33.
13. Id. at *36.
14. See id.
15. Id. at *47.
16. See generally Combs v. Health Care Servs. Corp., No. 03-09-00617-CV (53rd Dist.
Ct., Travis County, Tex. Oct. 26, 2009). Health Care Services Corporation is the successor
to Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas.
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HCSC in performing a federal contract are subject to the sale-for-resale
exemption. The district court not only agreed that the tangible personal
property qualified for the resale exemption but also held that the resale
tax exemption applied to leases, licenses, products, and taxable services
purchased by HCSC as a contractor to implement contracts with the fed-
eral government for Medicare and personnel administration. The comp-
troller, fearing that the court ruling could extend the sale-for-resale
exemption to service providers who sell only nontaxable services to the
federal government, has appealed.' 7
In another software suit, Verizon North Inc. asserted that certain com-
puter software it purchased is not tangible personal property because it is
not a computer program within the meaning of the Tax Code18 and appli-
cable regulations. 19 Verizon had paid over $1.5 million to SAP America,
Inc., for Texas sales and use taxes on the software and then paid GTE
Data Services, Inc., to configure, modify, and customize the software to
perform the necessary business functions.20 The issue was whether the
software fell within the statutory and regulatory definitions of a "com-
puter program"; if so, it was subject to sales and use tax.21 The Austin
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's finding that, in line with the
statutory definitions, the software was "coded for acceptance or use by a
computer system and designed to permit the computer system to process
data and provide results and information." 22 Verizon argued, on the
other hand, that the regulatory definition of computer program requires
that the series of instructions be "sold as a completed program" and that
because Verizon had to pay for configuring, modifying and customization
services, the software was not sold as a completed program. 23 Verizon
also argued "other necessary elements, components, and capabilities
were missing and had to be created before the software was complete." 24
However, the court of appeals determined that the regulatory language
focuses on the code and design of the software as sold, not the intended
use by the purchasers, so that whether or not software is sold as complete
or incomplete does not turn on the subjective intent of the buyer.25 The
court of appeals concluded that the software was complete when sold for
17. TEXAS COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIc ACCOUNTS, TREASURY OPERATIONS, FEBRU-
ARY 2010 BOND APPENDIX A-68 (2010), available at http://www.window.state.tx.us/
treasops/1002bond.pdf.
18. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 151.051, 151.009, 151.010, 15.0031 (Vernon 2008).
19. Verizon N. Inc. v. Combs, No. 03-08-00151-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 3779, at *1
(Tex. App.-Austin May 22, 2009, pet. denied).
20. Id.
21. Id. at *2.
22. Id. at *34.
23. Id. at *7-8. The district court found that GTE made configurations, modifications,
extensions, and customizations to the software in Texas that were necessary before the
software performed the business functions for which it was purchased. Id. at *8; see 34
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.308(b)(1) (2010) (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Computers-
Hardware, Software, Services, & Sales).
24. Verizon N. Inc., 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 3779, at *8.
25. Id. at *8-9. Several findings of fact by the district court indicate that the software
was complete as sold, and the court of appeals held such findings sufficient to establish that
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the use for which it was designed and was therefore a taxable "computer
program." 26
Several cases addressed other sales tax exemptions or exclusions. Jer-
man Cookie Co. v. Combs, for example, asserted "that certain bakery
products sold by Jerman are exempted from Texas sales tax as 'food prod-
ucts for human consumption"' pursuant to section 151.314 of the Tax
Code.27 The case centered on whether the bakery products sold were
considered "ready for immediate consumption" and therefore taxable.28
The Austin Court of Appeals focused on whether Jerman provided eating
facilities for the individual-sized portions of cookies and brownies sold in
quantities of five or less, not in a heated state, and for which eating uten-
sils were not provided. 29 The court of appeals then reversed and re-
manded the case to determine whether Jerman provided eating facilities
for its customers.30
In Southern Plastics, Inc. v. Combs, Southern Plastics claimed a refund
of sales taxes paid to the City of Kilgore for waste removal services, as-
serting that the taxes had been paid in error because the waste was "in-
dustrial solid waste," for which removal costs are not subject to sales
tax.31 The Austin Court of Appeals found at least two possible interpre-
tations of "industrial solid waste" as defined in Chapter 361 of the Health
and Safety Code, the standard required by the regulations to qualify for
the exclusion from taxable real property services: (1) Southern Plastics'
the software was sold as a completed program in accordance with rule 3.308(b)(1) of the
Administrative Code. Id. at *11-12.
26. Id. at *12.
27. No. 03-08-00562-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 5698 (Tex. App.-Austin July 23,
2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Please note that the authors
endeavor to have at least one food case in each year's Survey. This year's cookies may be
more fun than the foods discussed in prior articles.
28. Id. at *5. The statute did not define "ready for immediate consumption," but rule
3.293(a)(9) of the Administrative Code (as in effect for the period at issue) did. Id. The
court of appeals noted that its holding did not apply to sales after October 1, 2003, the
effective date of changes to section 151.314 of the Tax Code, which expressly includes all
"bakery items sold without plates or other eating utensils" within the exemption for food
products. Id. at *11 n.4; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.314 (Vernon 2008).
29. Jerman Cookie Co., 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 5698, at *2. The court's opinion brings
to mind the old administrative "six-donut" presumption that a purchase of less than six
donuts was a purchase of food for immediate consumption. See Cafeteria Operators, L.P.
v. Rylander, 96 S.W.3d 460, 462 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied).
30. Jerman Cookie Co., 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 5698, at *16. The court of appeals
considered certain conflicting facts in attempting to determine whether eating facilities
were provided by Jerman in the mall in which its store is located, including: (1) the land-
lord does not consider Jerman to be a "tenant of the food court"; (2) a map of the mall
listed Jerman's store in the "Food Court" category; (3) a photograph of the store showed
tables and chairs adjacent to the side of the store facing the direction of the food court
area. Id. at *14, *16.
31. No. 03-08-00149-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 5107, at *3 (Tex. App.-Austin July 1,
2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). See TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 151.0048(a)(3)(B) (Vernon 2008); 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.356(a)(3)(E) (2010) (Comp-
troller of Pub. Accounts, Real Property Service). Different types of waste were removed
from Southern Plastics' manufacturing plant, including waste from manufacturing plastic
closures and liners, discarded wrapping or packaging materials received with raw materials,
and Southern Plastics' offices. S. Plastics, Inc., 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 5107, at *2.
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interpretation that the definition tracks whatever the term means in the
Health and Safety Code, and (2) the comptroller's interpretation that she
intended to incorporate the language of the statutory definition, which
she would then interpret, as a matter of tax policy and administration. 32
The comptroller also contended that Southern Plastics failed to comply
with the recordkeeping requirements of the rule. 3 3 The court of appeals,
perhaps giving more weight to the comptroller's arguments than might be
expected, determined that it could not conclude that the comptroller's
construction was plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations or
with the comptroller's interpretation that not all of the solid waste "re-
sults from" or is "incidental to" the plant's manufacturing processes.34
Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed the denial of refund.35 The case
also illustrates the deference sometimes accorded to the comptroller's in-
terpretation of her own rules.36
In Reynolds Metals Co. v. Combs, the Austin Court of Appeals af-
firmed the refund denial related to the company's purchase of repair and
replacement parts for two ship unloaders that operated on rails, holding
that the purchases did not qualify for the rolling stock exemption.37
Reynolds claimed that the "unloaders qualify as rolling stock because
they operate on and are supported by rails."3 The provision at issue
exempts "[r]olling stock, locomotives, and fuel and supplies essential to
the operation of locomotives and trains."39 The unloaders, crane-like
machines, operated on rails and were used to move bauxite ore from the
holds of arriving ships to conveyor belts elsewhere in the shipyard for
further processing. The parties agreed that the unloaders were operated
on rails. However, the width of the rails on which the unloaders were
operated was much greater than the width of the rails for a typical rail
car. Also, the unloaders were used only between arriving ships and con-
veyor belts and not connected to a traditional railroad. 40 The court of
appeals ruled against the taxpayer, finding that the legislative acceptance
doctrine was not applicable.41
In one of the more intriguing cases of the year, the Austin Court of
Appeals interpreted the language of section 151.011 of the Tax Code to
32. Id. at *32-33. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.356(a)(3)(E).
33. S. Plastics, Inc., 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 5107, at *17.
34. Id. at *34.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. No. 03-07-00709-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 2466, at *1 (Tex. App.-Austin Apr.
8, 2009, pet. denied).
38. Id. at *2.
39. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.331(a) (Vernon 2008).
40. Reynolds Metals Co., 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 2466, at *34.
41. Id. at *24. The court of appeals determined that for the legislative acceptance
doctrine to apply based on an administrative interpretation of a statute, the interpretation
must be "longstanding, uniform, and clear"; according to the court, "the Comptroller did
not have a long-standing, clear and consistent policy of interpreting the 'rolling stock' ex-
emption to apply literally to any equipment mounted on what could be termed railroad
rails" rather than only to traditional railroad equipment. Id. at *12, *24.
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reach a result that may be different from what legislators intended when
they amended this section in 2003. In Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages v.
Combs, Southwestern Bell sought a refund of use tax paid on printing
charges for out-of-state printing of telephone directories that were subse-
quently distributed in Texas. 4 2 Southwestern Bell purchased paper rolls
from out-of-state paper mills to print telephone directories out of state
before bringing the directories to Texas for distribution. In 2003, the leg-
islature amended Tax Code section 151.011(a), specifically excluding
from the definition of use "printed material that has been processed,
fabricated, or manufactured into other property . .. transported into this
state," thereby reversing, in this context, the effect of Sharp v. Morton
Buildings, Inc.4 3 Southwestern Bell argued that the 2003 amendment ex-
cludes charges for printing services from use tax.4 4 Southwestern Bell
also relied on the relatively recent case, May Department Stores Co. v.
Strayhorn, which held that the essence of the transaction for printing ser-
vices is tangible personal property.45 The court of appeals, however, con-
cluded that regardless of how "printed material" is defined, only printed
material that serves as a component of some other finished product is
excluded from use tax under section 151.011(a) of the Tax Code. 4 6
Therefore, because Southwestern Bell had conceded that the telephone
directories themselves were a final product and were not incorporated
into other property, the refund on the printing charges was denied. 4 7 It is
not clear how the court would have decided the case had Southwestern
Bell requested a refund for only the component parts of the directories
(e.g., paper, ink, binding, etc.) and not for the printing services it pur-
chased, but it can be inferred from the way the court of appeals inter-
preted the statute that only if the raw materials are components of a final
product would they be exempt from the use tax.
The concurring opinion, although agreeing that the printed material
was taxable, disagreed with the court's rationale. 48 The concurring justice
(perhaps more accurately) believed that the amendment specifically in-
tended not to address printed materials. 4 9 The concurring opinion further
observed that the court of appeals erred in making a departure from the
42. No. 03-07-00638-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 582 (Tex. App.-Austin Jan. 30, 2009,
pet. denied) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
43. Id. at *5-6. In Sharp v. Morton Buildings, Inc., the Austin Court of Appeals held
that raw materials purchased out of state, incorporated into other products out of state,
and then subsequently brought into Texas are not subject to the use tax. 953 S.W.2d 300,
303 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, pet. denied). The 2003 amendment legislatively overturned
Morton by imposing a use tax on raw materials purchased out-of-state and incorporated
into another product before being brought back into Texas. Sw. Bell Yellow Pages, 2009
Tex. App. LEXIS 582, at *6.
44. Sw. Bell Yellow Pages, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 582, at *6-7.
45. Id. at *7-8; May Dep't Stores Co. v. Strayhorn, No. 03-03-00729-CV, 2004 Tex. App.
LEXIS 7681 at *20-21 (Tex. App.-Austin Aug. 26, 2004, pet. denied) (mem. op., not des-
ignated for publication).
46. Sw. Bell Yellow Pages, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 582, at *8.
47. Id. at *10.




May decision by changing the law "in a significant way" by creating "two
categories of printed material: (1) printed material that is a component of
some final product, and (2) printed material that is a final product it-
self."50 It will be interesting to see the ramifications of this decision, but
it is almost certain that this holding will result in confusion as taxpayers
and the comptroller struggle to determine which printed materials are
component parts and which are final products, how to interpret the
"other printed material" exclusion, and how this decision and the May
decision can coexist.
B. NEw LEGISLATION
Although the 2009 legislative session did not make overwhelming
changes to the sales and use tax, several amendments are noteworthy.
Texas has not adopted the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement,51
but the legislature does sometimes look to it for language or concepts.
For example, legislators, like followers of the Streamlined Sales and Use
Tax Agreement, sought to expand the popular back-to-school exemption.
As amended, section 151.327 of the Tax Code adds certain school supplies
to the existing exemption for backpacks and now defines backpacks. 52
The legislature also amended Tax Code section 151.310 to provide that,
for purposes of obtaining a refund or claiming a credit, organizations ex-
empt under section 151.310 are not considered exempt from paying sales
tax on taxable items they purchase before the earlier of the date on which
the organization applies for exempt status with the comptroller or the
date the comptroller assesses tax liability as a result of an audit.53 The
legislature also added section 151.4261 to the Tax Code to provide that a
"seller is entitled to a credit or reimbursement equal to the amount of
sales tax refunded to a purchaser when the purchaser receives a full or
partial refund of the sales price of a returned taxable item."54
Consistent with other efforts to bring more media productions to
Texas, 2009 legislation amended the Government Code to provide for the
creation of up to ten "media production development zones" in the state
containing "qualified media production locations."55 New Tax Code sec-
50. Id.
51. See generally STREAMLINED SALES AND USE TAX AGREEMENT (2009), available at
http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/uploads/downloads/Archive/SSUTA/
SSUTA%20As%20Amended%2009-30-09.pdf.
52. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.327(a)(1)-(2) (Vernon 2009) ("'Backpack' means a
messenger bag, book bag, or a pack with straps that a person wears on the person's back,
including a backpack with wheels if the backpack can also be worn on the back. The term
does not include an item that is commonly considered luggage, a briefcase, an athletic bag,
a duffle bag, a gym bag, a computer bag, a purse, or a framed backpack.").
53. Id. § 151.310(f).
54. Id. § 151.4261.
55. TEx. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 485A.103 (Vernon 2009). A media production develop-
ment zone must: (1) be in a metropolitan statistical area, the principal municipality of
which has a population of more than 250,000 and adequate workforce, infrastructure, facil-
ities, or resources; (2) be recognized as a media production development zone by ordi-
nance or of municipality or county commissioners court; and (3) contain a qualified media
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tion 151.3415 exempts from sales tax for a maximum of two years certain
items sold or used to construct, expand, improve, equip, renovate, or
maintain a media production facility at a qualified media production
location.56
In an economy in which tourism dollars are also a critical source of
revenue, the legislature added section 151.0565 to the Tax Code to define
"destination management services" and to clarify that companies which
provide such services under qualified destination management services
contracts are consumers of taxable items sold in connection with their
services.57 Although services in Texas are not taxable unless they are spe-
cifically subject to tax, the new code section offers additional certainty by
explicitly providing that these destination management services provided
under contract are not taxable services.58
Faced with continuing challenges to the way in which local sales and
use taxes are collected and distributed, the legislature made several sig-
nificant changes to local tax provisions. First, sections 321.203 and
323.203 of the Tax Code were amended to change the sourcing for local
sales tax purposes, requiring sellers to collect local tax based on the place
of business where the retailer first receives the customer's order, pro-
vided that the order is placed in person at that place of business, rather
than based on the shipped-from location. 59 To avoid adversely impacting
taxpayers and jurisdictions that had entered into economic development
agreements in reliance on pre-amendment law, the legislature also en-
acted a limited grandfather provision. 60 In addition, section 321.002 was
production location within its geographical boundaries that meets stated criteria. Id.
§ 485A.101. A qualified media production location must be land or other real property in
a media production development zone and must: "(1) be used exclusively to build or con-
struct one or more media production facilities; (2) if the real property is a building or other
facility, be renovated solely for the purpose of being converted into one or more media
production facilities; or (3) if the real property consists solely of one or more media pro-
duction facilities, be improved or renovated for that purpose or will be expanded into one
or more additional media production facilities." Id. § 485A.102.
56. TEX. TAX. CODE ANN. § 151.3415(b) (Vernon 2009).
57. Id. § 151.0565(a).
58. Id. § 151.0565(b). A "qualified destination management company," among other
requirements, must receive at least 80% of annual total revenue from providing or arrang-
ing for destination management services, including transportation management, booking
and managing entertainers; coordination of tours or recreational activities; meeting, con-
ference, or event registration or staffing; event management; and meal coordination. Id.
§ 151.0565(a)(2).
59. TEX. TAX CODE §§ 321.203, 323.203 (Vernon 2009). The amendments were tech-
nically effective June 19, 2009, but not implemented until later.
60. Municipalities (seeking grandfather protection) that entered into economic devel-
opment agreements were required to provide certain information by September 1, 2009,
including information identifying the warehouses covered by each agreement and the retail
outlets served by such warehouses. Id. § 321.204(c-3). The special local tax sourcing rules
relating to economic development agreements expire September 1, 2014. Id.; see also Tex.
S.B. 636, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009) (focusing on imposition of the franchise tax and local sales
and use taxes, including the authority of a county or other local governmental entity to
receive local sales tax information). "Other local governmental entities" can request cer-
tain information about local sales taxes imposed by such entities, including with respect to




amended to provide that a "kiosk" is not a place of business. 61
Amended Tax Code section 321.1055 allows certain special-purpose
districts to impose local sales and use tax on the residential use of gas and
electricity.62 Effective January 1, 2010, a fire control, prevention, and
emergency medical services district or a crime control and prevention dis-
trict located in all or part of a municipality that imposes a tax on the
residential use of gas and electricity will be allowed to impose the tax
throughout the district.63 However, legislators declined to enact any of
the several bills that would have offered local jurisdictions much broader
authority to enact new taxes, even if the taxes exceeded the two percent
cap mandated by law.
The legislature also enacted multiple changes regarding aircraft and ag-
ricultural operations. Tax Code section 151.328 was amended to exempt
certain aircraft, including machinery and equipment used in an agricul-
tural aircraft operation, from sales tax.6 4 Aircraft sold in Texas to a per-
son for use exclusively in connection with agricultural use and specifically
for certain uses, including predator control, crop dusting, and seeding,
and machinery and equipment exclusively used in aircraft operation as
defined in FAA regulations,65 are exempt from sales tax.6 6 For purposes
of the aircraft exemption, the "exclusive" use requirement is met if 95%
of the use is for the described purposes.67 The exemption for machinery
and equipment does not include the explicit reference to 95%, leaving
taxpayers and the comptroller to wonder if the legislature intended the
word "exclusive" to have the same meaning in these two sections.68
Similarly, Tax Code section 151.316 was amended to expand exemp-
tions for property used in agricultural operations and for aircraft used in
connection with agriculture. 69 The exemptions now include, among other
things:
tangible personal property, including a tire, sold or used to be in-
stalled as a component part of a motor vehicle, machinery or other
equipment exclusively used or employed on a farm or ranch in the
building or maintaining of roads or water facilities or in the produc-
61. Id. § 321.002(a)(3) (providing that a kiosk is a "small, stand-alone area or structure
used solely to display merchandise and/or submit orders from taxable items from a data
entry device, or both" located entirely within another retailer's place of business, "at which
taxable items are not available for immediate delivery to a customer").
62. Id. § 321.1055.
63. Id. § 321.1055(a)-(b).
64. Id. § 151.328(h).
65. See 14 C.F.R. § 137.3 (2010) (addressing agricultural aircraft operation).
66. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.328(a)(5). The 95% standard is conceptually similar
to the long-established comptroller position that if more than 5% of a lump-sum charge for
services is attributable to taxable services, the total charge is presumed taxable, effectively
allowing a 5% de minimis rule. See, e.g., 34 TEX. ADMIN CODE § 3.330(d)(2) (2010)
(Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Data Processing Services) (articulating this standard in the
context of data processing services).
67. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.328(h).
68. See § 151.328(d), (h).
69. Id. § 151.316(a) (exempting from sales tax certain tangible personal property com-
ponents of machinery, equipment, or vehicles used in certain agricultural applications).
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tion of: (A) food for human consumption; (B) grass; (C) feed for
animal life; (D) or other agricultural products to be sold in the regu-
lar course of business. 70
The legislature also exempted "tangible personal property incorporated
into a structure that is used for the disposal of poultry carcasses in accor-
dance with Section 26.303 [of the] Water Code." 71 Though the agricul-
tural theme continues throughout much of the session and disposing of
poultry carcasses seems like a good idea, including sales tax exemption
requirements in the Water Code instead of the Tax Code makes them
more difficult to locate.
C. COMPTROLLER RULES
Several rules track or implement legislative changes. Amendments to
Rule 3.365, pertaining to the three-day tax-free weekend in August, dif-
ferentiate between the sales tax holiday for clothes, shoes, and school
supplies and the sales tax holiday for Energy Star items.72 The rule also
redefines "school backpack" "to exclude luggage, briefcase, athletic bag,
duffle bag, gym bag, computer bag, purse and framed backpack from the
definition."73 Other amendments to the rule address comptroller policy
concerns, such as sales of items sold in prepackaged combinations con-
taining both exempt and non-exempt items. 74
II. FRANCHISE TAX
In 2006, the Texas legislature modified the long standing franchise tax,
resulting in an unusual tax that is now computed by reference to "taxable
margin" and is therefore sometimes referred to as the "margin tax." Pre-
vious editions of the Texas Survey have focused in detail on this tax,
which has thus far produced significantly less revenue than anticipated.75
During the current Survey period, more taxpayers filed returns, franchise
tax audits of the margin tax began, and taxpayers and the comptroller
alike continued to struggle to fill statutory gaps and answer multiple
questions.
70. Id. § 151.316(a)(10).
71. Id. § 151.316(a)(12); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.303 (Vernon 2008).
72. 34 Tex. Reg. 6440 (2009); adopted 34 Tex. Reg. 8338 (2009) (codified at 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.365).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ohlenforst et al., Taxation, 62 SMU L. REV. 1461 (2009)
[hereinafter Taxation 2009]. Note that one piece of legislation from the 2007 session be-
came effective during the Survey period: Effective April 1, 2009, TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 171.074 (Vernon 2009) provides that "[a] nonprofit corporation organized under the De-
velopment Corporation Act (Subtitle C1, Title 12, Local Government Code) is exempted
from the franchise tax"; Cynthia M. Ohlenforst et al., Taxation, 61 SMU L. REv. 1131




Courts of appeals issued numerous sales and property cases during the
Survey period, but they offered little guidance on the franchise tax. Even
the State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH) issued relatively
few franchise tax decisions, and all of them relate to the "old" franchise
tax. However, some of the SOAH hearings offer insight to issues that are
relevant, not only to contests involving the older version of the tax but
also to issues that arise under the revised tax.
Hearing No. 48,507, for example, focused on an apportionment issue
important to the franchise tax both before and after the recent revisions
to the tax.7 6 This hearing addressed a refund claim filed by a company
engaged in rail transportation. The taxpayer had initially treated all its
receipts from rail transportation as Texas receipts for the years at issue,
based on the fact that all of its tracks are located entirely in Texas. In its
refund claim, however, the company asserted that the portion of its re-
ceipts from interstate commerce should not be included in Texas receipts.
The company explained that some of the freight rail cars that it picked up
from customers in Texas were transported to interchange points at which
the railcars were transferred from the company's locomotive to another
company's locomotive and then transported to final destinations outside
Texas. Although all the interchange points were in Texas, the company
pointed out that the intrastate segments did not fall within the comptrol-
ler's own definition of "intrastate commerce."77 Relying on the comp-
troller's administrative rule provisions regarding apportionment by
transportation companies, the administrative law judge correctly con-
cluded that Texas receipts for transportation companies included only
transportation that both began and ended in the state and did not include
"intrastate segments of transportation in interstate commerce."78
B. NEw LEGISLATION
Because the margin tax produced less revenue than it was expected to
produce during its first year and because of the economic challenges fac-
ing the state and nation, legislators found it difficult-both politically and
economically-to modify the tax significantly during the 2009 legislative
session. Nor did the comptroller even propose a technical corrections
bill. Nonetheless, some franchise bills passed.
The legislature addressed the treatment of proceeds from sales of cer-
tain loans and securities for purposes of apportionment under the
franchise tax. This change was, in at least some respects, an effort to
return to pre-margin tax rules for this specific apportionment issue. As
amended, section 171.106 of the Tax Code now provides, "Notwithstand-
ing [s]ection 171.1055, if a lending institution categorizes a loan or secur-
76. See Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts, Hearing No. 48,507 (June 15, 2009).
77. Id.; cf 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.549(b)(45) (as in effect for 2003 and 2004)
(Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Taxable Capital: Apportionment).
78. Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts, supra note 76.
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ity as 'Securities Available for Sale' or 'Trading Securities' under
Financial Accounting Standard No. 115, the gross proceeds of the sale of
that loan or security are considered gross receipts" for apportionment
purposes.79
Other legislative changes addressed small businesses' complaints about
the tax. The no-tax-due threshold in Tax Code section 171.002 was modi-
fied to: (1) change the franchise tax no-tax-due threshold from $300,000
of total revenue to one million dollars of total revenue from the effective
date through December 31, 2011, and (2) change the no-tax-due thresh-
old from one million dollars to $600,000 beginning January 1, 2012.80 Ad-
ditionally, section 171.0021 was amended to address the discounts for
small businesses. The amendments provide that only the following two
discounts will be available: (1) forty percent for taxable entities with total
revenue greater than $600,000 but less than $700,000, and (2) twenty per-
cent for taxable entities with total revenue of greater than $700,000 but
less than $900,000.81
House Bill 469 amended the Government Code to establish a franchise
tax credit for the first three completed clean energy projects meeting cer-
tain compliance requirements (including being implemented in connec-
tion with the construction of a new facility), capped for each project at
the lesser of $100 million or ten percent of the capital cost.8 2 This legisla-
tion also added section 151.334 to the Tax Code to exempt certain compo-
nents of clean-energy projects from sales tax and amended section
313.021(4) of the Tax Code to address limitation on appraised value for
advanced clean-energy projects. In addition, Tax Code section 171.1011
was amended to allow qualified destination management companies to
exclude from total revenue certain amounts paid to others "to provide
services, labor, or materials in connection with the provision of destina-
tion management services."83
In an interesting bit of charity-related legislation, the legislature
amended Occupations Code section 2001.4335 relating to bingo to ad-
dress the operation and regulation of charitable bingo and the use of
bingo proceeds. Such bingo facilities are now exempt from the franchise
79. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.106(f-1).
80. Id. § 171.002(d)(2).
81. Id. § 171.0021(a). Pre-revision discounts were (1) eighty percent if total revenue
was greater than $300,000 but less than $400,000; (2) sixty percent if total revenue was
greater than $400,000 but less than $500,000; (3) forty percent if total revenue was greater
than $500,000 but less than $700,000; and (4) twenty percent if total revenue was greater
than $700,000 but less than $900,000. Id. § 171.0021 (Vernon 2008).
82. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 490.352(c) (Vernon 2009). No credit is to be issued
before September 1, 2013, and the "subsection expires on September 2, 2013." Id.
§ 490.352(e). This legislation also provides for the Railroad Commission to issue a certifi-
cate of compliance, and for the University of Texas-Austin Bureau of Economic Geology
to verify that the electricity-generating facility associated with the project is sequestering at
least seventy percent of the carbon dioxide from the electricity generation. Id.
§ 490.252(b); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 151.334, 313.021(4)(c).
83. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1011(g-6).
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tax." Part of what makes this provision interesting is that the exemption
is in the Occupations Code instead of the Tax Code-another example of
straying tax provisions.8 5
C. COMPTROLLER RULES
A new set of franchise tax rules to implement the revised franchise tax
was adopted on December 28, 2007, and became effective on January 1,
2008.86 Last year's Texas Survey focused on many of the changes to the
franchise tax rules.87 The comptroller proposed amendments to some
franchise tax rules during 2009.88 Although a summary of all of the rules
is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worthwhile to note some key
issues.
Passive Entities. Rule 3.582, which addresses passive entities' exclusion
from the franchise tax, has been the subject of debate and scrutiny since it
was first proposed. In October 2009, the comptroller proposed new lan-
guage that was widely criticized by various taxpayer advocates.8 9 Specifi-
84. TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 2001.4335 (Vernon 2009).
85. Id.
86. E.g., 32 Tex. Reg. 6271 (2007), adopted 32 Tex. Reg. 10013 (2007) (codified at 34
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.581 (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Margin: Taxable & Nontax-
able Entities)); see generally 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.582 (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts,
Margin: Passive Entities), 3.583 (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Margin: Exemptions),
3.584 (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Margins: Reports and Payments), 3.585 (Comptrol-
ler of Pub. Accounts, Margin: Annual Report Extensions), 3.586 (Comptroller of Pub. Ac-
counts, Margin: Nexus), 3.587 (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Margin: Total Revenue),
3.588 (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Margin: Cost of Goods Sold), 3.589 (Comptroller of
Pub. Accounts, Margin: Compensation), 3.590 (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Margin:
Apportionment), 3.591 (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Margin: Combined Reporting),
3.592 (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Margin: Additional Tax), 3.593 (Comptroller of Pub.
Accounts, Margin: Franchise Tax Credits), 3.594 (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Margin:
Temporary Credit for Business Loss Carryforwards), 3.595 (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts,
Margin: Transition).
87. See Taxation 2009, supra note 75.
88. On October 30, 2009, proposed rule amendments appeared in the Texas Register.
Six of the proposed amendments received no comments and were published on December
25, 2009, with explanations in the preamble that the amendments were intended to reflect a
change in policy, effective December 31, 2009. See generally 34 Tex. Reg. 7563 (2009),
adopted 34 Tex. Reg. 9469 (2009) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.584); 34 Tex. Reg.
7568 (2009), adopted 34 Tex. Reg. 9470 (2009) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.587);
34 Tex. Reg. 7573 (2009), adopted 34 Tex. Reg. 9471 (2009) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.589); 34 Tex. Reg. 7576 (2009), adopted 34 Tex. Reg. 9471 (2009) (codified at 34
TEX. ADMIN. CODE 3.590); 34 Tex. Reg. 7581 (2009), adopted 34 Tex. Reg. 9472 (2009)
(codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.591); 34 Tex. Reg. 7585 (2009), adopted 34 Tex. Reg.
9472 (2009) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 33.593). For example, Rule 3.589, regard-
ing compensation, was amended to increase the maximum per-person deduction from
$300,000 to $320,000, effective for reports due on or after January 1, 2010, and to clarify
that amounts paid to anyone, not just independent contractors, that are reportable on In-
ternal Revenue Service Form 1099 may not be included in calculating the compensation
deduction. 34 Tex. Reg. 7573 (2009), adopted 34 Tex. Reg. 9471 (2009) (codified at 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.589). Rule 3.590, regarding combined reporting, was also amended to
provide that "a combined group will determine its eligibility for the 0.5% tax rate, dis-
counts and E-Z Computation based on the total revenue of the combined group as a whole
after eliminations." 34 Tex. Reg. 7576 (2009), adopted 34 Tex. Reg. 9471 (2009) (codified
at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.590).
89. 34 Tex. Reg. 9464 (2009) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.582).
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cally, the proposed rule was designed to implement the comptroller's
view that certain passive income could be recharacterized as active in-
come in certain instances.90 The State Bar of Texas, Tax Section and the
Texas Society of Certified Public Accountants commented that the pro-
posed language contradicts the Tax Code because Texas Tax Code section
171.0003(a-1) designates certain sources of income as passive, regardless
of how the income was earned.91
Fortunately, the comptroller ultimately agreed. The Texas Register
preamble to the version of Rule 3.582 adopted shortly after the Survey
period explains that "the comptroller believes that the legislature did not
intend for income from active operations to be included in passive in-
come," but essentially agreed that the current language of the statute
does not provide sufficient differentiation to justify recharacterizing pas-
sive income.92 The comptroller's proposed, but ultimately deleted, lan-
guage could have called into question the practicality of the passive entity
exemption, because the language provided that income identified as pas-
sive could nonetheless fail to be passive if it arose out of a taxpayer's
"operations." The proposed language also suggested that an entity's oth-
erwise passive income from a subsidiary might not be passive if the sub-
sidiary were controlled by the entity or an affiliate. In addition, the
amended rule no longer defines federal gross "[i]ncome by reference to
the Internal Revenue Code; new language was added to define federal
gross income as the income that is reported on an entity's federal income
tax return."93
Initial Reports. Historically, first-time filers of franchise tax returns
based their filing dates and computations on whether the report was for
an initial period, a second period, or a regular annual period. Applicable
statutes and rules provided a complex mechanism for determining the
due dates and the periods with respect to which tax is computed. 94 How-
ever, with the elimination of the old taxable capital and earned surplus
calculations, the comptroller has determined that these old report mecha-
nisms are no longer necessary. Therefore, the comptroller adopted
amendments to Rule 3.584, changing the due date for franchise tax initial
reports to make it consistent with the annual report due date. 95 Thus, the






94. See, e.g., TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.151, 171.201, 171.202 (Vernon 2008).
95. Tex. Reg. 7563 (2009), adopted 34 Tex. Reg. 9469 (2009) (codified 34 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.584).
96. Id. This change is effective for taxable entities becoming subject to the tax on or
after October 4, 2009. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.584 (2010). Entities that become subject
to the tax between October 4, 2009, and December 31, 2009, will file their first annual
report by May 17, 2010. Id. Entities that become subject to the tax in 2010 will file their
first annual report by May 16, 2011. See id. The rule also includes examples. Although
some may argue that the comptroller lacks statutory authority to change the report period
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Total Revenue. Amendments to Rule 3.587 regarding total revenue
were adopted without changes to the proposed text.97 Although the rule
tracks legislation, discussed previously, regarding exclusions from total
revenue for qualified destination management companies, the rule also
addresses other items not included in the statutory amendments. New
language was added to clarify that uncompensated care charges do not
include any portion of a charge that the health care provider has no right
to collect under a private health care plan, and language was deleted to
allow uncompensated care charges to include charges for services covered
by certain programs. 98 In addition, the rule was amended to provide that
amounts reported on line 19 of Internal Revenue Service Form 8825 (the
net gain/loss from the disposition of property from rental real estate ac-
tivities) are now included in the calculation of total revenue for an S cor-
poration. 99 According to the comptroller's preamble, both amendments
"more accurately reflect . . . [the comptroller's] current policy."'oo Fi-
nally, and controversially, language was added to Rule 3.589 to clarify the
comptroller's position "that net distributive income that is subtracted
from total revenue may not be included in the determination of compen-
sation."10 In addition, Rule 3.587 was amended to clarify "that neither
the upper tier entity nor the lower tier entity filing under the tiered part-
nership provision qualifies for no tax due, discounts and the E-Z Compu-
tation if . . . the lower tier does not meet the criteria."1 02
III. PROPERTY TAX
A. REPORTED CASES
As in past years, the courts focused on whether property is subject to
tax in the first place (or whether it is exempt or nontaxable because it is
provisions, most will applaud the retirement of the Byzantine system that confused many
taxpayers. Rule 3.584 was also amended to reflect statutory changes to § 171.002 of the
Tax Code, regarding no-tax-due thresholds, and § 171.0021 of the Tax Code, regarding
discounts.
97. 34 Tex. Reg. 7568 (2009), adopted 34 Tex. Reg. 9470 (2009) (codified at 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.587).
98. Id. Services performed for a contracted rate from a private health care plan or
services performed for an agreed-upon rate from an individual can now be included in
uncompensated care charges.
99. See id.
100. See id. See also 32 Tex. Reg. 9466 (2009) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.583) (adding bingo units to the list of exemptions, but removing Internal Revenue
Code § 501(c)(9) entities from the list of exempt entities because, according to the comp-
troller, this type of entity was added to the list in error).
101. See 34 Tex. Reg. 7573 (2009), adopted 34 Tex. Reg. 9471 (2009) (codified at amend-
ment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.589).
102. 34 Tex. Reg. 7568 (2009), adopted as 34 Tex. Reg. 9470 (2009) (codified at 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.587). The tiered partnership rules permit some flexibility for some taxa-
ble entities, such as medical groups or other businesses that include lower-tier partnerships
that operate a business and upper-tier partnerships that are comprised of individual doc-
tors or professional associations. However, the tiered partnership mechanism is often con-
fusing. Note too, that tiered partnership reporting is not allowed if the lower-tier entity is
included in a combined group.
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only temporarily in the jurisdiction) and, if so, how to value the property
and whether taxpayers have complied with the strict procedural require-
ments for challenging taxes.
While tax revenues decreased and uncertainty about legislative changes
to the state's property tax regime increased, appraisal districts and prop-
erty owners continued to fight over the districts' jurisdiction to tax
property.
The property owner in Aviall Services v. Tarrant Appraisal District, a
supplier of aircraft parts, had shipped items to its depot, which was lo-
cated within a federal enclave that was located within Texas's geographi-
cal boundaries.103 Aviall protested the appraisal district's assessment of
property tax on the items, claiming that, because they had been shipped
into the federal enclave, they qualified for the Freeport exemption pro-
vided for in article VIII, section 1, of the Texas constitution.10 4 Pursuant
to that provision, property acquired in or imported into Texas that is for-
warded outside the state within 175 days is exempt from property tax. 05
Aviall's position centered on an argument that the federal enclave, de-
spite being located entirely within Texas's geographical boundaries, is
"outside" of Texas for purposes of the Freeport exemption.106
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals rejected Aviall's arguments, electing
instead to read into the Freeport exemption a requirement that property
be shipped outside the state in terms of location, not in terms of jurisdic-
tion or power.107 The court of appeals also noted the familiar canons that
exemptions are to be strictly construed against taxpayers, and exemptions
must have affirmative statutory authority and may not be raised simply
by implication. 08
Aviall was not the only case during this Survey period addressing the
taxability of aircraft and related items; as is typical, there were a number
of such cases before the various courts. In Starflight 50, LLC v. Harris
County Appraisal District, the taxpayer argued that the aircraft which the
taxpayer had unexpectedly relocated to Houston from New Orleans on
the eve of Hurricane Katrina was located in Texas only temporarily and
therefore should not be subject to Texas property tax.109 Noting that the
return to New Orleans, like the relocation to Houston, was unplanned,
the Houston First Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's take-nothing
judgment against the taxpayer." 0
In ICAN Enterprise, Inc. v. Williamson County Appraisal District, the
taxpayer cited to Texas Tax Code section 25.07 to argue that its leases of
hangars owned by the city of Georgetown and located at the Georgetown
103. 300 S.W.3d 441, 443-44 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2009, no pet.).
104. Id. at 444.
105. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-j.
106. Aviall, 300 S.W.3d at 446.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 446-47.
109. 287 S.W.3d 741, 744 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
110. Id. at 747.
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Airport should be exempt from property tax.111 Section 25.07 provides
that a leasehold interest in exempt property may not be included in ap-
praisal rolls if the property is part of a public transportation facility
owned by a city and is a building used primarily for aircraft equipment
storage. 112 The Austin Court of Appeals held that the exemption did not
apply to ICAN's leasehold in the hangars, because the hangars were used
to store whole aircraft, not just aircraft parts.' 13
In a case that recalls Peoples Gas, Light, & Coke Co. v. Harrison Cen-
tral Appraisal District, discussed in last year's Survey,11 4 the Eastland
Court of Appeals upheld a trial court holding that oil located in a tank
farm in the Midland Pipeline System was not subject to property tax in
Midland County.115 In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals noted
that the Pipeline System is an interstate common carrier system that is
regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. The court of
appeals also relied on the fact that oil located in the tank farm is not there
for storage, but rather on its way to various in-state and out-of-state desti-
nations, typically exiting a tank within six to seventy-two hours after hav-
ing first entered it.116 Based on these facts, the court of appeals
determined that the oil had been placed in and remained in the stream of
interstate commerce, and any stoppage was not related to a business pur-
pose of the owner. 117 As a result, the court of appeals held that the Mid-
land County property tax violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.118
The Houston First Court of Appeals tackled the intricacies of heavy
equipment valuation in Briggs Equipment Trust v. Harris County Ap-
praisal District.119 The taxpayer in that case was a seller of heavy equip-
ment subject to the Texas Tax Code section 23.1241 inventory valuation
requirement.120 That section provides that heavy equipment inventory
includes items of heavy equipment that a dealer holds for sale at retail,
including items of heavy equipment that are leased or rented but subject
to a purchase option by the lessee or renter. 121 The provision also sets
out a formula for calculating the value of a dealer's heavy equipment
inventory: from total annual sales, a dealer subtracts sales to dealers, fleet
transactions, and "subsequent sales." 122 The provision defines "subse-
111. No. 03-06-00594-CV, 2009 WL 1025084, at *2 (Tex. App.-Austin Apr. 17, 2009,
pet. denied).
112. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.07(b)(3) (Vernon 2009).
113. ICAN, 2009 WL 1025084, at *3.
114. See Taxation 2009, supra note 75, at 1471-73.
115. Midland Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 282 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. App.-
Eastland 2009, pet. denied).
116. Id. at 219, 221-24.
117. Id. at 223-24.
118. Id. at 224.
119. 294 S.W.3d 667 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. filed).
120. Id. at 669.
121. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.1241(a)(2) (Vernon 2009).
122. Id. at (b).
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quent sales" to mean certain dealer-financed sales of heavy equipment. 12 3
In rendering its inventory for property tax valuation, Briggs had sub-
tracted as "subsequent sales" a number of lease transactions that con-
tained a purchase option that the lessee never exercised. 12 4 In defense of
its calculation method, Briggs argued that once it had included leases
with purchase options in its top-line "total annual sales" amount, it
should be entitled to count subsequent leases of the same equipment as
"subsequent sales" of the equipment. 125 To buttress its position, Briggs
pointed to some of its leases that contained provisions for delay of pay-
ment and, in some circumstances, imposition of interest as a result of
delayed payment. 12 6 The court of appeals nevertheless held that such
provisions did not make the leases "dealer-financed sales" in this context
and rejected Briggs's position.127
The Houston First Court of Appeals considered the constitutionality of
the Texas Tax Code section 23.121 motor vehicle inventory valuation pro-
vision in Expo Motorcars, LLC v. Harris County Appraisal District.128
That provision values motor vehicle dealers' inventory as of January 1 of
a tax year based on the dealer's actual sales from the previous calendar
year.1 2 9 Expo argued that the section 23.121 valuation method created
unconstitutionally unequal, non-uniform taxation among motor vehicle
dealers, because dealers whose sales decrease in a tax year after their
inventories have been valued as of January 1 will pay more taxes than
dealers whose sales increase after valuation.130 The court of appeals
noted that in other retail contexts, the legislature has adopted a single-
date valuation method but opted instead for a sales-based method in the
motor vehicle context because the value of a motor vehicle dealer's in-
ventory fluctuates widely over the course of a year.131 The court of ap-
peals rejected Expo's argument that the sales-based method is arbitrary
and produces unconstitutionally unequal appraisals. 132
The Texas Supreme Court issued an interesting opinion addressing an
unusual procedural issue in Old Farms Owners Association v. Houston
Independent School District.33 In the Old Farms case, the taxing jurisdic-
tion had sent a 1997 tax bill to an incorrect address and, after having
discovered its error in 1999, sued the record property owner to recover
the delinquent taxes.1 3 4 The taxing units then nonsuited the case in 2000
123. Id. at (a)(8).
124. Briggs, 294 S.W.3d at 669-70.
125. Id. at 672.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. No. 01-08-00473-CV, 2009 WL 2232017, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July
23, 2009, pet. denied).
129. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.121(b) (Vernon 2009).
130. Expo, 2009 WL 2232017, at *4.
131. Id.
132. Id. at *5.
133. 277 S.W.3d 420 (Tex. 2009).
134. Id. at 421.
2010] Taxation 839
SMU LAW REVIEW
and refiled the suit in 2002.13s
The property owner prevailed at trial in 2003, arguing in the alternative
that, because the taxing district had sent the bill to the wrong address, the
tax had never become delinquent, and that, even if the tax had been de-
linquent, the taxing unit had never sent the five-year notice of delinquent
taxes required by the then-effective Texas Tax Code section 33.04.136
That provision, as effective prior to 2001, canceled penalties and interest
on delinquent property taxes if the taxing unit did not issue such a no-
tice; 137 however, the legislature repealed that portion of the provision in
2001.138 The 2001 legislation included a savings clause providing that the
provision as amended in 2001 did not apply to taxes subject to a delin-
quent tax suit pending before the 2001 effective date.139
The Texas Supreme Court held that the savings clause was broad
enough to apply to any collection suit filed prior to the 2001 amendment,
even if the suit was eventually nonsuited, and distinguished that circum-
stance from a dismissal, which the opinion likened to a circumstance in
which suit had never been brought in the first place. 140
A couple of perennial procedural issues continued to plague parties
challenging appraisal district actions during this Survey period-ques-
tions about whether the party bringing a challenge has standing to do so
and inadvertent agreements with appraisal districts that barred later suits
against the districts (remember last year's "be-careful-what-you-wish-for"
file?).
In three strikingly similar (not only to each other but also to Mann v.
Harris County Appraisal District and Verm v. Harris County Appraisal
District from last year's Survey' 4 1) cases, property owners were predict-
ably barred from bringing suit to challenge appraisal district valuations
when the owners' representatives had agreed to values in Appraisal Re-
view Board hearings.142
The courts saw a fresh slew of challenges to parties' standing to protest
appraisal district actions during the Survey period as well. In several of
the cases, courts determined that the party seeking to challenge the ac-
tion was not the owner of the property and therefore did not have
standing.143
135. Id.
136. Id. at 421-22.
137. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.04 (Vernon 1999).
138. Act of May 17, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1430, § 40, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 5109,
5122-23.
139. Id. at 5122.
140. Old Farms, 277 S.W.3d at 423-24.
141. See Taxation 2009, supra note 75, at 1476-77.
142. See, e.g., Prince v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., No. 14-07-00919-CV, 2009 WL
20975 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 06, 2009, no pet.); Loposer v. Harris County
Appraisal Dist., No. 14-07-00956-CV, 2009 WL 2146151 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
July 21, 2009, no pet.), Amidei v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., No. 01-08-00833-CV, 2009
WL 2050974 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 16, 2009, no pet.).
143. See, e.g., Ray v. Bexar Appraisal Dist., Nos. 04-08-00210-CV, 04-08-00212-CV,
2009 WL 700869 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Mar. 18, 2009, no pet.) (an individual owning
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B. NEw LEGISLATION
The big property tax news during the Survey period was a package of
sweeping property tax legislative changes proposed by Representative
John Otto and Senator Tommy Williams. Key to the package was a series
of provisions reforming the state's much-maligned property appraisal
methods.
House Joint Resolution 36 represents a major policy change and was
designed to improve accountability and consistency among appraisal dis-
tricts across the state.144 The Resolution contained legislative authoriza-
tion in three key areas, each of which appeared as a constitutional
amendment on the November 3, 2009 constitutional amendment general
election ballot: (1) providing for taxation of a homestead solely on the
basis of its value as a residence without regard to the property's highest
and best use;14 5 (2) authorizing a single board of equalization for two or
more adjacent appraisal districts that elected consolidated equaliza-
tions;146 and (3) providing for uniform appraisal standards on a statewide
basis.147 Voters approved all three in the November 3, 2009 general
election.148
Also part of the Otto-Williams package, House Bill 3612 allowed ap-
peals to the State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH) for certain
property tax disputes.149 The bill created a three-year pilot program in
Bexar, Cameron, El Paso, Harris, Tarrant, and Travis Counties in which
taxpayers may appeal to SOAH appraisal review board determinations
with respect to real or personal property valued over $1 million.15t The
bill's SOAH appeal is an alternative to a district court challenge, and the
party who does not prevail will bear costs, including a $300 filing fee.151
Senate Bill 771, another key piece of the Williams-Otto appraisal re-
form package, imposes a number of new and different standards with
which appraisal districts must comply when using market data to value
property.152 The bill made changes to the Texas Tax Code's arbitration
both the limited partner interest and the general partner interest of a partnership that held
property did not have standing as the property owner for purposes of bringing a property
tax dispute); BACM 2002 PB2 Westpark DR LP v. Harris County Appraisal District, No.
14-08-00493-CV, 2009 WL 2145922 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] June 21, 2009, no
pet.) (when a former owner of property no longer had standing to bring a property tax
dispute and a subsequent owner did not timely bring the dispute, substitution of the subse-
quent owner's name as the disputing party was not appropriate where there was no "doing
business as" or similar relationship between the parties).
144. Tex. H.J.R. 36, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009).
145. Id. at § 1.01.
146. Id. at § 2.01.
147. Id. at § 3.01.
148. Office of the Secretary of State, 1992-Current Election History, http://elec-
tions.sos.state.tx.us/elchist.exe (select "2009 Constitutional Amendment Election" and
"Statewide Race Summary" and "Submit") (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
149. Tex. H.B. 3612, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009).
150. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2003.901 et seq. (Vernon 2009). Dallas County was
included in earlier versions of the bill.
151. Id.
152. Tex. S.B. 771, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009).
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provisions to provide for expedited binding arbitration as an alternative
to property owners who might otherwise file a Texas Tax Code section
42.01 action.153 It also amended Texas Tax Code sections 23.01, 23.013,
23.014 and 23.24 to provide that all available evidence specific to the mar-
ket value of a property shall be taken into account in determining the
property's value.154 It further provided that the chief appraiser may not
separately appraise any personal property valued as a portion of the in-
come of the real property when the real property is valued based on
rental income.155 The bill also required the chief appraiser to show that
an increase in value for a property whose value decreased in the previous
year is reasonably supported by substantial evidence, 156 required that
comparable sales must have occurred within twenty-four months of the
valuation date and must be adjusted to account for changes in market
value over time,157 and made clear that land may continue to qualify for
appraisal as agricultural use during droughts.158
House Bill 8, another component of the Otto-Williams property tax
reform measures, overhauled the comptroller's property value study in a
number of important ways.159 The bill required the comptroller to con-
duct a study at least every two years in each school district and annually
in districts in which the comptroller had determined that the local value
was not valid.160 The bill also changed the comptroller's appraisal district
review process in a handful of key ways: the bill created the Comptrol-
ler's Property Value Study Advisory Committee and required a school
district, appraisal district, or other governmental entity in the state to
comply with comptroller requests for information for the study, including
information that is statutorily confidential.161 The bill also repealed
Texas Tax Code section 5.101, which had provided for the comptroller to
establish a Technical Advisory Committee to provide professional and
practical expertise regarding the methodology used by the comptroller
for annual ratio studies,162 and it repealed Texas Tax Code section
5.12(g), which did not allow consideration of the results of the comptrol-
ler's annual study for tax years before 1989 in determining whether a per-
formance audit of an appraisal district was necessary.163
Though not a part of the Otto-Williams reform package, House Bill
3896 made significant changes to the state's tax abatement regime and is
worth noting.164 The bill resolved favorably for taxpayers questions that
153. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 41A.01, 41A.03, 41A.031 (Vernon 2009).
154. Id. §§ 23.01, 23.013, 23.014, 23.24.
155. Id. §§ 23.014, 23.24.
156. Id. § 23.01.
157. Id. § 23.013.
158. Id. § 23.522.
159. Tex. H.B. 8, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009).
160. See id. § 403.302.
161. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 403.304 (Vernon 2009).
162. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 5.101 (Vernon 2008); Tex. H.B. 8 at § 11.
163. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 5.12(g); Tex. H.B. 8 at § 11.
164. Tex. H.B. 3896, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009).
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had been raised repeatedly about whether tax abatement agreements
may commence after the date on which the parties enter into the agree-
ments, as well as about whether county commissioners may enter into tax
abatement agreements with parties other than owners of real property.
One key change, styled as a "clarification" of existing law, was to add a
new tax code provision that explicitly allows deferral of the commence-
ment of an abatement period until a date subsequent to the date on which
the abatement agreement is entered into. The new provision also makes
clear that the duration of tax abatement agreements may not exceed ten
years. 65 Another noteworthy change in the bill was the amendment of
an existing tax code provision to explicitly allow commissioners courts to
enter into tax abatement agreements with: owners of tangible personal
property located on real property in reinvestment zones with respect to
such real property; owners of leasehold interests in tax-exempt real prop-
erty located in reinvestment zones with respect to such leasehold inter-
ests; owners of tangible personal property or improvements located on
tax-exempt real property in reinvestment zones with respect to such tan-
gible personal property or improvements; and lessees of taxable real
property in reinvestment zones with respect to fixtures, improvements,
other real property, and tangible personal property subject to the lease or
located on the leased property.166
IV. PROCEDURE-AND FORM OVER SUBSTANCE
ASSERTIONS
The Tax Code provides specific procedures for challenging sales and
franchise tax assessments, claiming refunds, and challenging property tax
assessments or denials of exemptions. Rarely is a taxpayer successful in
challenging a Texas tax via a declaratory judgment, so the Texas En-
tertainment case is particularly interesting.167 Karpod, a sexually oriented
business, and Texas Entertainment Association, Inc., an association rep-
resenting the interests of sexually oriented businesses in Texas, filed suit
for declaratory and injunctive relief against the comptroller asserting that
the tax on sexually oriented businesses violated the state and federal con-
stitutions. In Combs v. Texas Entertainment Association, the Austin
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court that the tax "on
a sexually oriented business in an amount equal to $5 for each entry by
each customer admitted to the business" violated the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution.16 8 The court of appeals subjected the
tax to strict scrutiny after a lengthy determination as to whether the re-
striction was content-based or content-neutral and decided that the re-
striction was content-based.169 The comptroller conceded that the tax
165. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 312.007 (Vernon 2009).
166. See id. § 312.402.
167. Combs v. Tex. Entm't Ass'n, Inc. and Karpod, Inc., 287 S.W.3d 852 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2009, pet. granted).
168. Id. at 856.
169. Id. at 857-64.
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could not withstand strict scrutiny, and she was permanently enjoined
from assessing and collecting the tax.170
Occasionally, over the past many years, someone in the comptroller's
office has suggested that the comptroller should be allowed to
recharacterize transactions that-in the comptroller's view-did not have
a valid business purpose. A 2006 internal memorandum, for example,
suggested that certain types of (otherwise sales tax exempt) transfers of
aircraft or other tangible personal property could be closely scrutinized if
the transfers did not have a business purpose.171 More recently, the
comptroller's staff released a letter stating that the comptroller "reserves
the right to look through the legal form of a transaction to the realities; to
look at the end result and disregard the steps and intermediate entities a
taxpayer may have chosen to effect that result." 172 However, the applica-
tion of federal tax law concepts like step-transaction and form-over-sub-
stance characterizations is not authorized by the Texas Tax Code, and the
comptroller's efforts to adopt these theories would surely face multiple
challenges. Fortunately, as of the end of the Survey period, the comptrol-
ler had agreed that these theories would not be set forth as proposed rule
amendments, at least not in the immediate future.
V. CONCLUSION
Tough economic times increased the state's and local jurisdictions'
need for revenue and diminished taxpayers' willingness to pay taxes. It is
a combination that is likely to produce some interesting developments in
2010.
170. Id. at 858, 866.
171. See Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts, Document No. 200611755L (Nov. 15, 2006).
172. See Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts, Document No. 200908387L (Aug. 6, 2009).
Perhaps as further evidence that this interpretation would be a departure from Texas law,
the letter seeks to rely in part on Gregory v. Helvering and its discussion of federal income
tax and on Texas cases that, as the letter notes, address circumstances in which "the corpo-
rate fiction has been used to perpetuate a fraud." See generally Gregory v. Helvering, 293
U.S. 465 (1935). Neither these federal income tax cases nor the fraud cases appear applica-
ble to legitimate Texas tax planning. It is no coincidence that both these letters address
aircraft sales, an area of tax planning that the comptroller's staff finds particularly vexing.
Even vexing situations, however, do not justify disregarding taxpayers' legitimate tax
planning.
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